Introduction
In England and Wales, the Civil Procedure Rules regulate all aspects of court adjudication, including what happens when a litigant does not comply with the rules of process. This may trigger in an array of responses, from ignoring the breach altogether, through requiring the opposing party to complain about it, to levying costs sanctions against the non-complying litigant or even precluding him from relying on an individual point -or indeed, on his entire defence, effectively leaving the opponent to 'win' the case. Process requirements are essential to the administration of justice, and the extent to which they are enforced constitutes a measure of the efficiency of the process, that is, its ability to fulfil its purpose. There are however diverging opinions, broadly associated respectively with Aristotelian ideas of general and individual justice, as to what its purpose is. This leads to inconsistent applications of the rules and, eventually, uncertainty as to success or failure of individual cases in arguably similar circumstances of rule non-compliance, or an increase in appellate litigation by litigants in the hope of a more favourable application of the rules.
The administration of justice is a human endeavour and therefore no single perfect interpretation of an ideal rule is to be expected. However, the normal human wavering in this field is compounded by the fact that, while judges are required to apply substantive rules of law, and have very little leeway to diverge from or actively undermine them, they are given -or take -an open and apparently unfettered amount of discretion in determining when to apply those rules of procedure which entail such drastic consequences as the potential exclusion of a litigant from the forum for a mere 'technicality'. This article will argue firstly that there is no good reason for considering that rules of civil procedure are not capable of binding judges in the same manner as any other type of state regulation, and secondly that any discretion granted * School of Law, University of Leicester, carla.crifo@le.ac.uk. The research for this article was carried out during a semester's Visiting Fellowship at Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, with support and funding from the Italy/US Fulbright Commission, the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Leicester. Grateful thanks are owed to Professor Stephen Subrin for his insights, to colleagues at Leicester and Warwick Universities for astute comments, and to the anonymous peer reviewers. All errors remain my own.
to judges faced with non-complying litigants ought not to be extended to a subjective assessment by the judge of the very purposes of his function, such that the rules are reduced merely to guidelines for 'doing justice'. Instead, a formalist approach to civil procedure should be taken, whereby the rules bind the judges and expressly acknowledge the basic philosophy of justice underlying that particular legal system, rather than leaving these matters to the judges alone.
The article will develop the argument in the following manner: in section 1 the background will be set, with the history of the current understanding of civil procedure in England and Wales as secondary to the substantive rights whose enforcement they facilitate and, as such, something that can safely be left to the experience of individual judges than to general law. Section 3 provides a preliminary justification for the article's emphasis on the judicial discretion to enforce process requirements, rather than the litigant's duty to obey them. The article then moves to consider judicial attitudes to the ultimate process rule: the rule that requires compliance with the other rules as a condition to reach the stage where a substantive judgment can be delivered. The rule is considered in two jurisdictions, the federal United States (section 4) and England (section 5), where it appears in a slightly different form but with arguably similar import. The necessity of a comparative approach arises from the attempt to identify the normative preferences that influence the application of the rule in question, and the extent to which those preferences are unique to the English system. The analysis suggests the same two conflicting philosophies guide the exercise of discretion: 'justice on the merits' and 'complex justice'. These are detailed and examined in section 6, but the article is not dedicated to the normative question of which of these philosophies, which both seek to determine the function of state adjudication, is preferable. Instead, I argue that, while a choice must clearly be made, this is something that must be formally incorporated into the rule system, rather than left to the discretion of judges in individual cases.
With this in mind, section 7 demonstrates that, despite the criticisms levelled at formalism, it is certainly possible for a legal system to embrace formalism and achieve the desired result of judicial constraint. Lastly, section 8 addresses some particularities of the common law which may undermine a general call to formalism: that its procedural rules are written primarily by, or with significant input from, the judiciary itself; the presence of an almost 'pre-constitutional' inherent power of the individual court to regulate its own process, with no higher authority to which to be beholden; and the necessity for formalistic rules to be 'transsubstantive', that is, of general application and with no underlying substantive content.
Background
For some, civil procedure has become almost a byword for mindless technicality and formality. Any critic of a mechanic application of rules can easily find support in decided cases or, indeed, in an established legal philosophical tradition berating judges and lawyers for believing themselves to be so in thrall to mere process rules as to render the determination of rights and obligations unnecessarily complicated and often unfair. From the 19 th century onwards, 1 that judges could consider themselves and the litigants in front of them bound by the rules of procedure was criticised with such force that a formal approach to procedure appears unthinkable still today.
Bentham, to whom we owe many insights into the English system of litigation, was particularly scathing with regards to procedural technicality, which he characterised as the 'multiplication of the occasions of extracting fee; the cause of factitious complication, intricacy, obscurity, unintelligibility, uncognoscibility in the system of procedure'. 2 Bentham's contempt for procedural formalism meant that in his new system judges would be granted a vast amount of unappealable discretion with regard to procedure, 3 precisely because no important substantive consequence would be allowed to flow from procedural constraints.
The critique of formalism in civil procedure begun in the 19 th century is inextricably linked with the consideration of its rules as secondary, ancillary, and devoid of any interest beyond the merely instrumental. This assessment continued throughout the next century: for Hart, the rules which define the procedure to be followed are 'secondary', rather than primary, rules; 4 moreover they are not as important as the other secondary rules, those which confer the power to make determinations of the question whether a primary rule has been broken, or 'rules of adjudication '. 5 Additionally, the former, while having features of rules of recognition, have it in a 'form [that]… will be very imperfect.' 6 If civil procedure has no higher function than merely to facilitate the application of all the other, more important rules, then it can be easily considered comparatively unimportant. It is to be treated as pure mechanism.
If the above is true, there is no political or ideological choice to be made in, and no weight need be given to, individual, specific rules of procedure; if the administration of justice is mere machinery, it can be left to its operators, the judiciary, to devise, enact and apply the best procedures for its delivery. It is then merely an issue of internal organisation whether, if at all, a judge or a court can derogate, interpret purposively, or integrate the rules thus created. Where a rule is missing or an eventuality has not been foreseen, the inherent jurisdiction of the court to regulate its own business can easily fill the gap. However, the identification of civil procedure as merely a subsidiary (at best) part of the regulation and rights-attribution powers of the state, delegated to the court as 'organisation of their own process', is unsatisfactory in the present day.
On the one hand, Bentham's critique is itself part of an extremely critical approach to judge-made law. Thus, although he was clear that in procedural matters the court should have almost unfettered discretion, that was within a proposed system of subjection to the will of Parliament in all other matters. If formalism consists in thinking of the rules as binding in their ability to constrain the creativity of their interpreter, Bentham's dismissal of technicalities in procedure was subject to the recognition of another type of constraint at a higher legal level.
On the other hand, in the real world one is faced with the undoubted fact that, despite any attempts to minimise the theoretical importance of procedure and give priority to the substantive law to be applied, rules of procedure carry an inordinate amount of weight, both practical and legal. The application of the rule has led to starkly conflicting results. Such variation appears in decided cases not because the rule is claimed to be ambiguous, and thus needing explanation, but because courts explicitly refer to one of two broader philosophies of procedure, 'justice on the merits' or 'complex justice' which are generally nowhere to be found in the rules of court nor in any superior source of law.
These philosophies will be further analysed in section 6. The choice of which philosophy to apply appears to be entirely free, and dependent on no more than an 7 Eg, participatory governance, process legitimacy, process peacefulness, respect for human dignity, personal privacy, consensualism, procedural fairness, the procedural rule of law, procedural rationality, and timeliness and finality: RS Summers, 'Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes -a Plea for "Process Values" ' (1974-75) individual judge's 'normative preferences', 10 in a manner than may appear in conflict with basic principles of predictability and certainty of prescription which underpin the rule of law. Civil procedure in the Common Law tradition is today so entirely within the discretion of the judge, that it seems normal that she should be allowed to identify for herself the boundaries of her own function and jurisdiction. This is a direct consequence of the historical and philosophical minimising of the role of the rules of civil procedure. The further consequence of such an approach is that the outcome of rules is not to be found in the rules themselves, as created through an established process, 11 but in the personality and tendency of the judges, whose appointment, history and humanity becomes attractive to criticism, while much less amenable to critical analysis and change.
In order to identify the external or subjective rationales that affect the application of the rule in question, and the extent to which those rationales recur or are unique to the English landscape, a comparative approach can provide useful insights. Within the common law judicial tradition, England still influences many jurisdictions and their court systems and organisations. In looking for the common law jurisdiction that is today most independent of English practice and ideas, one can not help but alight on the earliest system to assert its own identity in a manner both derived from, and in conscious opposition to, that of England, to be found in the United States, and within it, the federal system. This has the additional advantage of allowing access to a rich body of academic literature in the field. In the United States, the study of civil procedure has not been excessively concerned with Benthamian aspersions, although the reforms of the federal court system and its regulation 12 have followed a similar path as in England, and conflated the Common Law and Equity practices to the evident advantage of the latter, with its broad definitions and extensive discretionary powers. In both jurisdictions, the Anglo-American conflagration of common law and If the party to whom such a rule applies chooses to disregard it, the normal outcome is that a choice accrues to the other party. He may do nothing or he may seek an appropriate order from the court. If he chooses to do nothing, nothing will happen; if he chooses to bring the matter before the court, a choice accrues to the discretion to change those natural consequences that would ensue from the litigant's behaviour, it becomes essential to understand whether the judge in her exercise of discretion is part of the physical realm, a cog in the machine, or above it all, in the form of a dea ex machina.
Involuntary dismissal in the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The position in the United States with regards to the compliance rule is deceptively simple, much more so than in England. It is therefore a good starting point to draw out the main issues that arise with the rule.
Rule 41(b) provides:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Although the rule is couched in general terms, amongst the provisions in the Fed.
R. Civ. P. it is rarely used to justify or apply sanctions for disobeying the rules themselves. Several other, more specific Rules allow for the explicit possibility of sanctions for non-compliance, the most notable being Rule 11, which imposes on the attorney a duty of honest belief in the legal grounding of the claim; 24 and Rule 37(b)
which imposes a series of specific sanctions which the court may order for failure to obey a discovery order. These include striking pleadings, dismissing the action or part of it, and giving a default judgment against the disobedient party, as well as preventing the disobedient party from relying on some claims or defences and staying proceedings. 25 While the latter rules have been the object of intense debate, especially when subject to amendment, in part because of specific constitutional requirements, The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted. The power to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts. The power is of ancient origin, having its roots in judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur entered at common law, e.g., 3 Blackstone, Commentaries (1768), 295-296, and dismissals for want of prosecution of bills in equity, e.g., id., at 451. It has been expressly recognized in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). … Neither the permissive language of the Rule-which merely authorizes a motion by the defendant-nor its policy requires us to conclude that it was the purpose of the Rule to abrogate the power of courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief. The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
Thus the rule recognised, rather than created, the power to dismiss, and therefore the court was not bound by the literal import of the rule. 32 The danger of course is that by maintaining the existence of an inherent power even where there is an explicit rule, the court can extend or limit the scope of this or other rules based on policies that are states (by circular reference to the rule) that there is a 'self-evident' and inherent power. Secondly, it refuses the idea that enshrining the power -or some effect of itinto a Rule would have exhausted it. Thirdly, it calls upon the argument of historical authority to bolster its claims. Finally, and most importantly for the present discussion, it gives as a rationale the power of the courts to regulate their own business, if necessary to the extent of streamlining their dockets, in order to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
There was a strong dissenting opinion from Justice Black, with whom Chief
Justice Warren concurred (Justice Douglas merely dissented). Justice Black began by agreeing with the single dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, who had said
Plaintiff's cause of action was his property. It has been destroyed. The district court, to punish a lawyer, has confiscated another's property without process of law, which offends the constitution. A district court does not lack disciplinary authority over an attorney and there is no justification, moral or legal, for its punishment of an innocent litigant for the personal conduct of his counsel. 35 He then went on to criticise the majority's argument by pitting desirable against indispensable features of a court system: 36 It is of course desirable that the congestion on court dockets be reduced in every way possible consistent with the fair administration of justice. But that laudable objective should not be sought in a way which undercuts the very purposes for which courts were created-that is, to try cases on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the parties. ... When we allow the desire to reduce court congestion to justify the sacrifice of substantial rights of the litigants in cases like this, we attempt to promote speed in administration, which is desirable, at the expense of justice, which is indispensable to any court system worthy of its name.
Moreover, it seems plain to me that any attempt to cut down on court congestion by dismissing meritorious lawsuits is doomed to fail even in its misguided purpose of promoting speed in judicial administration. Litigants with meritorious lawsuits are not likely to accept unfair rulings of that kind without exhausting all available appellate remedies. Consequently, any reduction of trial court dockets accomplished by such dismissals will be more than offset by the increased burden on appellate courts. This case seems to me an excellent example of the sort of wholly unnecessary waste of judicial resources which can result from such overzealous protection of trial court dockets. The case has twice been before the Court of Appeals and has twice been brought to this Court as a result of 'time-saving' ruling handed down by the trial judge.
Justice Black's argument is in two parts: firstly, there is a clear hierarchy between 'justice' and 'administration' considerations, with the latter incapable of trumping the former. Secondly, the additional satellite litigation that would ensue to challenge exercises of discretion would equal, if not outweigh, the strain on the court system caused by allowing existing and already lengthy cases to remain on the dockets.
Elsewhere in the opinion he also expresses his discomfort at the ensuing arrogation of determinative power over the case by the judge, whereas, constitutionally, a jury ought to decide if a case is devoid of merits. The general statement of the availability of dismissal as sanction for noncompliance with rules or court orders is now qualified 40 by the accretion of jurisprudential dicta -mostly at Appeals Court level. Dismissal now is to be considered the most extreme sanction among the many available to the trial court.
41
In addition, it would appear that there is no consensus in the case-law as to which factors ought to be considered before the court determines whether a case may be involuntarily dismissed. Some cases emphasise the importance of clearing the docket 37 The point is again to be considered with the historical and constitutional backdrop of American Federal litigation: Janatka (n 26 (1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order; (2) whether the plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings; (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard; and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.
43
In other cases, the emphasis is on whether the behaviour is so 'deliberate and contumacious' as to justify the sanction. Court, the courts were loath to deny the plaintiff an adjudication on the merits due solely to procedural default, unless the default had caused prejudice to his opponent which an award of costs could not compensate. 45 The defendant could apply to the court for an order to dismiss the action for want of prosecution, in terms very similar to those of Rule 41(b), but the rules 46 invested the court with the broadest possible discretion. 42 In order for a court to dismiss a case as a sanction for failing to comply with court order, the district court must consider five factors: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favouring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) An order of dismissal for want of prosecution was rather difficult to obtain. As it was put in the modern statement of the rule, 47 the power should be exercised only where the court is satisfied either (1) that the default has been intentional and contumelious, e.g. disobedience to a peremptory order of the court or conduct amounting to an abuse of the process of the court; or (2) (a) that there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff or his lawyers, and (b) that such delay will give rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial of the issues in the action or is such as is likely to cause or have caused serious prejudice to the defendant either as between themselves and the plaintiff or between each other or between them and a third party.
Striking out upon non-compliance required that it was impossible to conduct a fair trial, and that the defendant had suffered some prejudice. This in turn would be sanctions in Biguzzi should also have constrained the exercise of discretion of the court upon applications to dispense with such sanctions. It is only because the court exercises a control of proportionality over the possible consequences of failure to comply (especially when they derive from a court order themselves, as in an order given in the form of an 'unless' order 55 ) that there is (or ought to be) little shrift given at the later stage of potential reconsideration.
The overriding objective (CPR 1.1) also provided for the first time a regulatory template of the court's function, introducing some principles to guide the court in applying the Civil Procedure Rules, in particular notions of proportionality and equality of arms. 56 Additionally, case management was introduced as a means of wrestling from the parties, and giving to the court, overall control of the proceedings.
The rules governing non-compliance are within Part 3, dealing with the court's case management powers. Here we find the traditional version of the (active) power of the court to strike out a statement of case, if 'it is an abuse of the process of the court or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings, or there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.' (CPR 3.4(2)(b) and (c)). Part 3 also contains the avowedly revolutionary 57 change with regards to the effect of sanctioning rules. The effects of rule non-compliance were now to be automatic, 58 and the rules only gave the court discretion to grant relief subsequently, having regard to a long, non-exhaustive list of factors:
(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order the court will consider all the circumstances including -(a) the interests of the administration of justice; (b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly; (c) whether the failure to comply was intentional; (d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure; (e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules, practice directions, court orders and any relevant pre-action protocol; (f) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party or his legal representative; (g) whether the trial date or the likely trial date can still be met if relief is granted; 55 See for a definition and practice notes, AAS Zuckerman, 'A colossal wreck -the BCCI -Three Rivers litigation' (2006) 25 CJQ 287. 56 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report (HMSO 1995) ch 26, para 30. 57 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (HMSO 1996) ch 6, 'Sanctions'. 58 CPR 3.8 '(1) Where a party has failed to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order, any sanction for failure to comply imposed by the rule, practice direction or court order has effect unless the party in default applies for and obtains relief from the sanction.' (h) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and (i) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party. (2) An application for relief must be supported by evidence. … the object of the Courts is to decide the rights of parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights … I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, 59 CPR 3.9 (in force until 1 April 2013). 60 Post-Woolf, 'the policy behind the civil process in future was no longer to singularly focus on the achievement of substantive justice in the case immediately before the court. It was to consider the right of all citizens to a fair process that could lead to a decision on the merits'; Sorabji (n 51) 401. the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy.
More than a hundred years later, Millett LJ criticised the then imminent Woolf reforms in Gale v Superdrug Stores Plc:
65 Litigation is slow, cumbersome, beset by technicalities, and expensive. From time to time laudable attempts are made to simplify it, speed it up and make it less expensive. Such endeavours are once again in fashion. But the process is a difficult one which is often frustrated by the overriding need to ensure that justice is not sacrificed. It is easy to dispense injustice quickly and cheaply, but it is better to do justice even if it takes a little longer and costs a little more.
The administration of justice is a human activity, and accordingly cannot be made immune from error. When a litigant or his adviser makes a mistake, justice requires that he be allowed to put it right even if this causes delay and expense, provided that it can be done without injustice to the other party.
… I do not believe that these principles can be brushed aside on the ground that they were laid down a century ago or that they fail to recognise the exigencies of the modern civil justice system. On the contrary, I believe that they represent a fundamental assessment of the functions of a court of justice which has a universal and timeless validity. costs, and to suggest improvements to reduce costs, noted that the vast amount of satellite litigation created by the inconsistent application of CPR 3.9 contributed considerably to increased costs. 69 He suggested that the rule be simplified, indicating two alternative versions. 70 Eventually, neither of his specific proposals was taken up, but the general idea of reforming and simplifying the rule, by removing the 'laundry list' of factors to be considered, was accepted. As of 1 April 2013, CPR 3.9 states:
(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need-(a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.
It is as yet unclear how far the new version of the rule satisfies either Lord Justice Jackson's concerns or those of the academics who suggested changes to the rule.
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Past history of procedural reform in England however suggests that drafting changes may not be sufficient to eradicate unwanted cultural hang-ups. Such cultural imperatives, however, are not to be limited to the 'philosophies of procedure'. Instead they go much further back, to the belief that the choice of which philosophy to adopt when applying the rule is subjectively that of the judge. The following sections will attempt to address, and dispel, this misconception.
6. Two philosophies: Justice for one, justice for many.
The American Federal court system and the English system of civil courts, while both part of the Common Law family, 72 share very little today in terms of structure, constitutional framework, and even the character of judicial personnel. The American
Federal system was designed to apply to a vast territory and provide a relatively . 85 Zuckerman, 'Dismissal for Delay' (n 46). 86 Birkett v James (n 47). In addition, the philosophy is apparent in decisions where the court looks not to the non-compliance of one party, but beyond it to 'whether a trial is still possible': this factor haunts the pre-2013 version of CPR 3.9, at letter (g), although in that rule it is limited to a regard for the trial date, rather than the trial itself. 87 Zuckerman, 'Dismissal for Delay' (n 46) 223, points out that, in Birkett v James itself, 'the prevention of delay is not an objective of Lord Diplock's test. Rather, it is designed, first, to protect the authority of the court and, second, to prevent prejudice to defendants.'
rule. 88 The 'complex justice' philosophy suggests just as strong an awareness, 89 both by theorists and judges, of their role as implementers of a higher policy to which they are beholden. This philosophy is relativist, in that it redefines 'justice' as not an unlimited, private right that a litigant has vis-à-vis the court, but rather as a right of the community that each member should be given an opportunity to litigate fairly, considering that public resources are not unlimited and must be managed appropriately. This utilitarian approach sees 'justice' redefined to include time and cost to the parties themselves, on the one hand, and contextualised to include consideration of external factors, such as the need to treat equally other potential users of limited judicial resources.
Both sides of the debate allow that an uncompromising application of their interpretation of 'justice' will entail some collateral damage, or an acknowledged failure to satisfy some of the demands put upon the court: the 'justice on the merits' camp accepts that there will be delays and costs to the opposing party (these are considered to be for the most part compensable in damages), to the court and to any protagonists, any re-drafting, no matter how admirable, is subject to wilful misinterpretation.
Should the rules be taken as meaning what they say?
Formalism is only applicable to the relationship between judges and rules. This is because I adopt -for the English position -the liberal reconstruction of the litigant as free to choose to engage in civil litigation. 91 In addition, a formalist claim, even limited to some rules or even some general principles, when applied to the field of civil procedural rules must take into account two special features of those rules: the fact that the decision-makers are also the rule-makers and the value-neutrality claimed for those rules. The first of these is merely of superficial appeal, and relatively easily dismissed. The second feature however is essential to a formalist claim. Both will be discussed in depth in section 8.
In relation to the compliance rule, it is the individual judge, who in England is also 92 the trier of facts, who has the power to either exercise discretion in dismissing a case where the litigant has breached the rules or an order of the court (US version) or exercise discretion to allow that same litigant to avoid the automatic consequences of that breach (English version). As has been seen, there is already a formal difference in 95 To the extent that 'meaning can be "contextual" in the sense that that meaning draws on no other context besides those understandings shared among virtually all speakers of English': FF Schauer, as a descriptive and conceptual matter, rules can generate determinate outcomes; … those outcomes may diverge from what some decisionmakers think ought to be done; and … some decisionmakers will follow the external mandates rather than their own best particularistic judgment. 96 What is important in his work is that the issue of formalism is defined as a denial of choice: 'rules… exclude from consideration factors that a decisionmaker unconstrained by those rules would take into account.' 97 Despite the very different theoretical bases, this is not dissimilar to considering one of the functions of formalities as having a behaviour-modification function, 98 if one is considering the behaviour in question to be that of the decision-maker herself. The main consequence of adopting a formalist approach therefore is that it provides a means for preventing a decision-maker from taking into account any additional factor that is not permitted in the rule itself. This must be easier when the choice is binary -as between the 'philosophies of justice' identified above.
Schauer proceeds to admit that a constraint of choice may not necessarily be A Good Thing. It carries heavy consequences: in exchange for predictability or certainty, rules get in the way. … Rules doom decisionmaking to mediocrity by mandating the inaccessibility of excellence … that could possibly emerge from allowing the decisionmaker free access to all potential features: … a rule-bound decisionmaker, precluded from taking into account [other features], can never do better but can do worse than a decisionmaker seeking the optimal result for a case through a rule free decision; … to stabilize… is to give up some of the possibility of improvement in exchange for guarding against the possibility of disaster... we must therefore decide the extent to which we are willing to disable good decisionmakers in order simultaneously to disable bad ones. 99 On a general level, this appears to be a 'worst case scenario' approach. In an ideal world, there would be no need to constrain decision-making because the decision makers themselves would be able to reach the best decision possible, and in that ideal world, the best answer is within reach of human endeavour. In Schauer's view, formalism works because it prevents bad decisions, but does not foster the 'best' decision-making. In this sense, it allows a certain amount of mediocrity in order to achieve consistency, certainty and orthodoxy. However, there are more recent 'Formalism' (1988) and exhaustive (as a binary choice between philosophies must necessarily be), it may even lead to better, rather than just not-worse, outcomes.
On the other hand, formalism is not to be confused with a strict adherence to a rigid literalist interpretation. There may be overlaps between the two, and the latter may be used in order to pursue the former, but they are not indistinguishable. For example, the use of the word 'may' or 'discretion' in a rule -specifically the rules here taken into consideration -does not necessarily imply that the decision, as to whether to exercise the discretion, is entirely free and unconstrained, as a purely grammatical reading would indicate. 103 With regards to the exercise of discretion in case management decisions, for example, the Australian High Court in a recent, important case 104 influential beyond its shores, has highlighted the importance of the context, primarily the regulatory and 'systemic' context in which the discretion is to be exercised. As a commentator wrote,
[a] discretion, as the High Court explained in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University, is a decision-making process where no single rule or principle mandates a particular decision or result. Subject to the 100 Levy (n 71). 101 Levy (n 71) 148. 102 Levy (n 71) 152. 103 It would appear to be a case of the rule 'meaning what it says' but not necessarily 'saying what it means'. For the proposition that judicial discretion, even when apparently unfettered, is never absolute, A Barak, Judicial Discretion (Yale University Press 1989) 19-21, citing in particular Lord Scarman in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 All ER 529 (HL), 551: 'Legal systems differ in the width of the discretionary power granted to judges; but in developed societies limits are invariably set, beyond which the judges may not go. ' general purposes for which a discretion is created, the decision-maker is free to choose the decision from a range of possibilities. … a discretionary power confers on the decision-maker a latitude of individual choices, but not such that the discretion is left at large. It is confined by matters that the court may or must take into account in reaching its decision. A discretion must be exercised in the context of the purpose for which it was created. The authority that creates a discretion defines the purpose of the discretion. 105 If the purpose for which the discretion was created is made clear, it is therefore arguable that the constraint of judicial choice, feature of formalism, can act at the level of the purpose, or philosophy of procedure, rather than at the level of the rule.
The extensive satellite litigation concerning the pre-2013 version of CPR 3.9, for example, and in particular the much criticised 'tick-box' approach to the factors to take into consideration, 106 demonstrates that apparently constraining language, without a clear commitment to being constrained, does not suffice for the chosen philosophy to apply. In the binary landscape between philosophies of procedure, a formalist approach would infuse the rule with binding force sufficient to prevent the use of explicitly disapplied general principles, without by necessity requiring a slavish attention to literary standard and grammatical minima. England and in the USA, intimately connected with, some might say entirely responsible for, the creation of the rules themselves, but in some dicta, the power to strike out for non-compliance appears to predate the rule itself, in the guise of 'inherent power' of the court to 'regulate its own process'. The second concerns the scope of rules of procedure.
The history of the Rules Enabling Act 1934 107 in American federal procedure is well documented, but the details and limits, not to mention the very nature, of the rulemaking power itself are quite controversial. There appears to be a certain degree of agreement that the 1934 Act constitutes a delegation, by Congress to federal courts, of its legislative power over procedure. 108 It would further appear that, while the rulemaking power under the Rules Enabling Act 1934 is concerned with prospective rules of general application, the courts maintain an 'inherent power to manage their own business.' 109 The description of the extent of the inherent powers is, variably, a power that is 'necessary to the exercise of all others' or to 'provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties'. 110 As we have seen, one of the arguments underscoring the current application of Rule 41(b) is that the power to dismiss the claim is not exhausted by the rule itself, but is a function of the (underlying, parallel) inherent power.
111
In England and Wales, the rules of court are made pursuant to powers conferred by Act of Parliament 'for the purposes of regulating and prescribing the practice and procedure to be followed in the respective courts'. 112 Sir Jack Jacob clearly defines them as subordinate legislation, which may be held to be ultra vires if the rulemaking authority exceeds its own statutory powers, 113 and as judge-made since the Rules Committee, from 1833 when the power was first conferred 114 to today, 115 is composed mostly of judicial office-holders. English courts also retain a certain amount of inherent power, or 'inherent jurisdiction', which derives from the very nature of the court as a court of law… the essential character of the a court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with the power to maintain its authority, to control and regulate its process and to prevent its process from being abused or obstructed. 116 
